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Background: Misinformation about COVID-19 is common and has been spreading rapidly across the globe through social
media platforms and other information systems. Understanding what the public knows about COVID-19 and identifying beliefs
based on misinformation can help shape effective public health communications to ensure efforts to reduce viral transmission
are not undermined.
Objective: This study aimed to investigate the prevalence and factors associated with COVID-19 misinformation in Australia
and their changes over time.
Methods: This prospective, longitudinal national survey was completed by adults (18 years and above) across April (n=4362),
May (n=1882), and June (n=1369) 2020.
Results: Stronger agreement with misinformation was associated with younger age, male gender, lower education level, and
language other than English spoken at home (P<.01 for all). After controlling for these variables, misinformation beliefs were
significantly associated (P<.001) with lower levels of digital health literacy, perceived threat of COVID-19, confidence in
government, and trust in scientific institutions. Analyses of specific government-identified misinformation revealed 3 clusters:
prevention (associated with male gender and younger age), causation (associated with lower education level and greater social
disadvantage), and cure (associated with younger age). Lower institutional trust and greater rejection of official government
accounts were associated with stronger agreement with COVID-19 misinformation.
Conclusions: The findings of this study highlight important gaps in communication effectiveness, which must be addressed to
ensure effective COVID-19 prevention.
(J Med Internet Res 2021;23(1):e23805) doi: 10.2196/23805
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Introduction
False, misleading, or inaccurate health information can pose a
serious risk to public health and public action [1].
Misinformation about COVID-19 is common and has spread
rapidly across the globe through social media platforms and
other information systems [2-5]. In February 2020, the World
Health Organization’s Director-General declared the global
“overabundance” of COVID-19 information an “infodemic”
[6]. The term “misinfodemic” has since been coined to capture
the corresponding increase in misinformation surrounding the
virus [7].
Misinformation, which is typically compelling, persuasive, and
emotive, spreads on social media platforms significantly farther,
faster, deeper, and more broadly than factual information [8].
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This is particularly true within tight-knit communities, as has
been observed with the spread of vaccine misinformation among
some communities in the United States, Sweden, and the
Netherlands [9-12]. Common COVID-19 beliefs circulating in
mainstream media include framing the pandemic as a leaked
bioweapon, a consequence of 5G wireless technology, a political
hoax, and that the pandemic has been made up by governments
to control people. Others detail ineffective measures that
individuals can take to prevent or treat the disease, such as
exposing themselves to sunlight or taking vitamin C [13].
Misinformation can undermine public health efforts by shaping
beliefs and attitudes, particularly if encountered within a social
network, and reinforcing pre-existing values and positions [14].
Importantly, lower perceived risk or perceived efficacy of
prevention behaviors and altered perception of social norms
might influence individuals’ willingness to follow
recommendations such as voluntary testing, isolation and,
potentially, vaccination [15].
Understanding what the public knows about COVID-19 and
identifying beliefs based on misinformation can help shape
effective public health communication to ensure effort to reduce
its impact, such as debunking [16].
This paper uses data from a longitudinal cohort study of the
Australian public. Our aims were to: (1) investigate the
prevalence of COVID-19 misinformation beliefs in the study
sample; (2) examine whether any demographic, psychosocial,
and cognitive factors are associated with these beliefs; and (3)
investigate how these misinformation beliefs change over time.
Methods
Data Collection
The data used in this study are from a prospective, longitudinal,
national survey in Australia that aimed to evaluate variation in
the public’s understanding, attitudes, and implementation of
COVID-19 health advice during the first lockdown period in
2020 [17,18]. A total of 4362 participants were recruited
between April 17 and 24, 2020; these participants completed
the baseline survey (Round 1). This survey was administered
1 month after the first measures of prevention (physical
distancing and quarantine) were introduced in Australia when
an increasing number of COVID-19 cases were being reported.
A subset (n=3214) of this sample was invited for a longitudinal
follow-up to assess changes in attitudes, beliefs, and behavior
over the course of the pandemic. Of the 3214 participants, 1882
(58.5%) were invited for the Round 2 survey, which was
administered from May 8 to 15, 2020 (ie, 3 weeks after the
baseline or Round 1). Round 3 survey was administered to 1369
of the 3214 participants (43%) from June 5 to 12, 2020 (ie,
approximately 6 weeks after the baseline survey), when
restrictions in Australia showed signs of easing, and the number
of new COVID-19 cases and reported community transmission
had drastically reduced. Round 3 survey was administered prior
to the resurgence of COVID-19 cases in some areas of Australia.
Recruitment
Participants were recruited via advertisements on social media
(ie, Facebook and Instagram) and by a market research company
(Dynata). We used 2 different methods for recruitment with the
aim of achieving a more diverse sample. Only those participants
who were recruited via social media were invited for the
longitudinal follow-up.
Dynata is a market research company with access to a database
of 600,000 members in Australia who are willing to be involved
in online research studies. Dynata invites members to participate
in a certain research study only when they meet the study’s
eligibility criteria. For instance, only participants who met the
following eligibility criteria were included in this study: adults
(ie, age 18 years or older), currently living in Australia, and
ability to read and understand English.
Participants recruited via Dynata received points for completing
the survey; these points could then be redeemed against gift
vouchers, donations to charities, or cash. Participants recruited
via social media were given the opportunity to enter into a prize
draw for the chance to win one of ten $20 gift cards upon
completion of each survey round.
Ethics Approval
Ethics approval was obtained from the Human Research Ethics
Committee of The University of Sydney (2020/212). Participants
were informed about the purpose of the study, confidentiality,
and risks and benefits of participation at the beginning of the
survey. Completion and submission of the online questionnaire
were considered as evidence of consent.
Measures
The survey was built and administered using Qualtrics (SAP
SE), an online survey platform, and it was piloted within the
health literacy lab. Survey items included in each round were
modified from the national longitudinal study [17] to reflect
psychological, behavioral, and knowledge factors considered
most relevant at that stage of restrictions. Relevant measures
for this study are detailed in Table 1. Age, gender, education,
language other than English (LOTE) spoken at home, and
socioeconomic status were assessed in Round 1, as detailed in
our previous study [17].
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Table 1. Measures evaluated in this study.
JuneMayAprilDescription and reference (if applicable)Item
Main outcomes
COVID-19–related misinformation beliefsa
✓Data on the effectiveness of vaccines is often made upb.
✓✓Herd immunity would be beneficial for COVID-19 and this fact is covered up.
✓✓✓The threat of COVID-19 is greatly exaggerated.
✓✓✓Government restrictions are stronger than is needed.
Specific COVID-19 misinformationc
✓5G networks are spreading the virus.
✓Hot temperatures kill the virus.
✓Vitamin C is an effective treatment.
✓Ibuprofen exacerbates COVID-19.
✓The flu shot provides immunity to COVID-19.
✓Hydroxychloroquine is an effective treatment.
✓UV rays kill the virus.
✓There is a cure/vaccine for COVID-19.
✓Parcels from China can spread the virus.
✓The virus causing COVID-19 was engineered and released from a Chinese laboratory in Wuhan.
Explanatory variables
Digital health literacyd
✓I know what health resources are available on the internet.
✓I know where to find helpful health resources on the internet.
✓I know how to find helpful health resources on the internet.
✓I know how to use the internet to answer my questions about health.
✓I know how to use the health information I find on the internet to help me.
✓I have the skills I need to evaluate the health resources I find on the internet.
✓I can tell high-quality health resources from low-quality health resources on the internet.
✓I feel confident in using information from the internet to make health decisions.
Perceived threat of COVID-19e
✓✓Perceived public threat of COVID-19 (scale: 1=no threat at all to 10=very serious public health threat)
✓✓Perceived likelihood of personally getting sick from COVID-19 (scale: 1=not at all to 5=I definitely will)
Confidence in the governmentf
✓✓I am confident in the information about COVID-19 provided by the government.
✓✓I am satisfied with the amount of information about COVID-19 provided by the government.
✓✓I follow government advice on social distancing to help protect the wider community.
✓✓I am concerned that government recommendations about COVID-19 are not safe, or not enough is being
done.
Trust in institutionsg
✓Scientists involved in developing and testing new ways to control COVID-19
✓Researchers involved in tracking and predicting COVID-19 cases
✓Medical institutions (general practitioners, hospitals) involved in managing COVID-19 cases
COVID-19 information sources: social media
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JuneMayAprilDescription and reference (if applicable)Item
✓✓Social media reported as being used as a top-3 information source
Rejection of official accountsh
✓Much of the information we receive is wrong.
✓I often disagree with commonly held views about the world.
✓Official government accounts of events cannot be trusted.
✓Major events are not always what they seem.
aFour items, adapted from validated vaccine conspiracy beliefs scale [19]; scale: 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.
bThis question was from a validated scale and referred to vaccines in general, not a COVID-19 vaccine.
cTen items, taken from Australian Government Myth busting website [13]; scale: 1=definitely false to 5=definitely true.
dMean of 8 items from the eHealth Literacy Scale (eHeals) [20]; scale: 1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree.
eTwo individual items, adapted from [21].
fMean of 4 items, adapted from national Australian survey on vaccination [22]; scale: 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.
gMean of 3 items adapted from [23]; scale: 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.
hMean of 4 items, adapted from [24]; scale: 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree.
Statistical Analysis
Analyses were conducted using Stata/IC (v16.1; StataCorp
LLC). The threshold for statistical significance was set at P<.05.
Descriptive statistics (means and SD for continuous variables,
and frequency and relative frequency for categorical variables)
were calculated for participant characteristics and study
outcomes. To reduce the number of outcomes for analysis,
misinformation beliefs at baseline were combined into a single
measure using principal component analysis (PCA).
Associations between the extracted misinformation component
and possible explanatory variables were explored using truncated
linear regression (with lower-bound truncation based on the
minimum numerically possible value of the extracted
misinformation component that would result from responding
“strongly disagree” to all question items included in the PCA)
controlling for sociodemographic factors previously shown to
be associated with misinformation beliefs [17].
Changes in misinformation beliefs across study rounds were
examined using linear mixed models with random intercepts
by the participant and robust standard errors. These items were
analyzed individually owing to changes in the items included
in each round.
Dimension reduction using PCA was applied to the 10 specific
COVID-19 myth items (included in Round 3 of the study).
Multivariable truncated regression models (with lower-bound
truncation as described above) were used to examine
associations with the extracted components, using the same
explanatory variables as for the analysis of misinformation
beliefs from Round 1. Where survey items were repeated in
Round 3 (ie, perceived threat of COVID-19, confidence in
government, and use of social media as a “top-3” information
source), this version of the variable was included; otherwise,
the response at baseline was carried forward (ie, digital health
literacy, institutional trust, and sociodemographic variables).
An additional explanatory variable added in Round 3 (ie,
rejection of official accounts) was also included in these models.
Results
Sample Characteristics (Cross-Sectional and
Longitudinal)
Sample characteristics by each month are summarized in Table
2. When compared to national data, our sample was slightly
older, included more females, had higher educational attainment,
and was less likely to speak a LOTE at home.
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Table 2. Sample characteristics by study round (1-3).
ValuesSample description
LongitudinalCross-sectional
June: Round 3 (n=1369)May: Round 2 (n=1882)April: Round 1 (n=2006)aApril: Round 1 (n=4362)
44.6 (16.7)43.0 (16.6)43.1 (16.6)42.6 (17.4)Age (years), mean (SD)
Gender, n (%)
433 (31.6)589 (31.3)635 (31.7)1698 (39.9)Male
911 (66.5)1263 (67.1)1338 (66.7)2615 (60)Female
25 (1.8)30 (1.6)33 (1.6)49 (1.1)Not specified/other
Education, n (%)
198 (14.5)302 (16.1)317 (15.8)934 (21.4)High school or lower
140 (10.2)204 (10.8)223 (11.1)617 (14.1)Certificate I-IVb
1031 (75.3)1378 (73.1)1466 (73.1)2811 (64.4)University education
51 (3.7)70 (3.7)75 (3.7)274 (6.3)Language other than English
spoken at home, n (%)
4 (0.3)8 (0.4)8 (0.4)31 (0.7)Cantonese
2 (0.1)11 (0.6)12 (0.6)28 (0.6)Mandarin
2 (0.1)6 (0.3)6 (0.3)19 (0.4)Spanish
4 (0.3)5 (0.3)6 (0.3)15 (0.3)Vietnamese
1 (0.1)1 (0.1)1 (<0.1)14 (0.3)Hindi
01 (0.1)1 (<0.1)11 (0.3)Arabic
1 (0.1)4 (0.2)4 (0.2)10 (0.2)Indonesian
2 (0.1)2 (0.1)2 (0.1)10 (0.2)Urdu
35 (2.6)32 (1.7)35 (1.7)136 (3.1)Otherc
3.7 (1.4)3.7 (1.4)3.7 (1.4)3.6 (1.4)Socioeconomic status quintiled,
mean (SD)
Residential location, n (%)
719 (52.5)964 (51.2)1025 (51.1)2001 (45.9)New South Wales
201 (14.7)303 (16.1)323 (16.1)788 (18.1)Victoria
183 (13.4)254 (13.5)280 (14.0)672 (15.4)Queensland
91 (6.6)133 (7.1)138 (6.9)371 (8.5)Western Australia
64 (4.7)89 (4.7)93 (4.6)238 (5.5)South Australia
58 (4.2)74 (3.9)79 (3.9)144 (3.3)Tasmania
49 (3.6)59 (3.1)62 (3.1)120 (2.8)Australian Capital Territory
4 (0.3)6 (0.3)6 (0.3)28 (0.6)Northern Territory
aRound 1 longitudinal sample is a subsample of those included in the cross-sectional Round 1 sample, and who responded to at least one follow-up
survey. This group was recruited via social media only.
bCertificates I-IV are tertiary qualifications; see Australian Qualifications Framework [25].
cLanguages other than English spoken at home with cell counts <10 at baseline.
dSocioeconomic Indexes for Areas and Index of Relative Socioeconomic Advantage and Disadvantage Quintiles [1-5] based on participants’ residential
postcode.
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Misinformation Beliefs and Associations with
Sociodemographic, Cognitive, and Psychosocial
Variables (Cross-Sectional Sample in April)
One month into lockdown in Australia, of the 4362 participants,
753 (17.3%) agreed that data about the effectiveness of vaccines
is often made up (this survey question referred to vaccines in
general, not a COVID-19 vaccine); 652 (15%) agreed that herd
immunity would be beneficial for COVID-19, but this is
covered-up; 603 (13.8%) agreed that the threat of COVID-19
is greatly exaggerated; and 595 (13.6%) agreed that the
Australian government restrictions are stronger than required.
Responses on these items were moderately correlated (pairwise
r was between 0.36 and 0.63), with good internal consistency
(Cronbach α=.78) and sufficient sampling adequacy
(Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin or KMO=0.76). PCA of these items
resulted in the extraction of a single component with an
eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 60.7% of the variance
(component loadings are provided in Table S1 in Multimedia
Appendix 1). Estimated marginal mean values from the
multivariable regression model of misinformation beliefs at
baseline are provided in Table 3. Stronger agreement with
misinformation beliefs was significantly associated with younger
age, male gender, lower education, and primarily speaking a
LOTE at home (P<.001 for all). After controlling for these
variables, misinformation beliefs were found to be significantly
associated (P<.001 for all) with lower levels of digital health
literacy, perceived threat of COVID-19, confidence in the
government, and trust in scientific institutions.
Table 3. Multivariable truncated linear regression of strength of agreement with misinformation beliefs at Round 1a. Higher values of the outcome
indicate greater support for misinformation.
P valueEstimated marginal mean differences (95% CIs)ValueExplanatory variables
Sociodemographic variables
<.001−0.023 (−0.028, −0.018)42.5 (17.4)Age in years, mean (SD)
<.001−0.384 (−0.541, −0.226)2568 (59.9)Female gender (vs male)b, n (%)
<.001Education (vs high school or less), n (%)
.370.114 (−0.133, 0.360)609 (14.2)Certificate I-IVc
.005−0.270 (−0.459, −0.080)2760 (64.4)University education
<.0010.847 (0.569, 1.126)270 (6.3)Language other than English spoken at home, n (%)
.08−0.050 (−0.105, 0.005)3.60 (1.40)Socioeconomic status quintile, mean (SD)
Additional explanatory variables
<.001−0.250 (−0.356, −0.144)4.04 (0.74)Digital health literacyd, mean (SD)
<.001−0.336 (−0.372, −0.300)7.64 (2.17)Perceived public threat of COVID-19e, mean (SD)
<.0010.649 (0.475, 0.823)1091 (25.5)Not likely to get sick, n (%)
<.001−0.143 (−0.222, −0.063)5.15 (1.06)Confidence in governmentf, mean (SD)
<.001−0.663 (−0.738, −0.587)5.95 (1.06)Institutional trustg, mean (SD)
.060.151 (−0.001, 0.307)1923 (44.9)Social media used as a top-3 information source, n (%)
aSample for analysis comprised 4286 complete records; occasional instances of missing data for explanatory variables were not imputed due to the
small proportion of missingness (76/4362, 1.8%).
bMarginal mean differences are not reported for gender reported as “not specified” or “other” due to small sample size, but this data was included in
the regression model.
cCertificates I-IV are tertiary qualifications; see Australian Qualifications Framework [25].
dMean of 8 items, range: 1-5.
eLikert scale, range: 1-10.
fMean of 4 items, range: 1-7.
gMean of 3 items, range: 1-7.
Changes in Misinformation Beliefs Over Time
(Longitudinal Sample in April-June)
The prevalence of agreement with misinformation beliefs across
the study period is shown in Figure 1, which appears to be
generally consistent over time. Estimated mean values from the
fixed portion of linear mixed models are presented in Table 4.
A significant effect of time (P=.006) was identified for the
misinformation belief that the threat of COVID-19 is greatly
exaggerated, with pairwise contrasts showing an increase in this
belief between April and May; however, this difference was not
maintained in June. There was a decrease in the belief that herd
immunity is beneficial for COVID-19 but is covered up between
April and May (P<.001). No difference was observed in across
the study period with regard to the strength of government
restrictions belief (P=.41).
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Figure 1. Prevalence of agreement (i.e., responding as somewhat agree (5) to strongly agree (7) on the 1 to 7 Likert scale) with misinformation beliefs
by study month. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.].
Table 4. Estimated means (95% CIs) of fixed effects from linear mixed models analyses (with random intercepts by the participant) of agreement with
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aMean difference compared to Round 1 completed in April 2020.
bN/A: not applicable.
Specific Misinformation Beliefs and Associations With
Sociodemographic, Cognitive, and Psychosocial
Variables (Longitudinal Sample In June)
The level of agreement across the 10 COVID-19 misinformation
items from the Australian Government website had moderate
internal consistency (Cronbach α=.693) and sufficient sampling
adequacy (KMO =0.761). Application of PCA (with varimax
rotation) identified a 3-component solution with eigenvalues
greater than 1, which cumulatively accounted for 51.15% of the
variance (see Table S2 in Multimedia Appendix 1 for component
loading and proportion agreement with each item). Examination
of the contributing items to each component resulted in the
following 3 labels:
1. Symptom management and prevention misinformation:
principal component (PC)1 (explaining 18.9% of the total
variance)
2. Causes and transmission misinformation: PC2 (explaining
16.7% of the total variance)
3. Immunity and cure misinformation: PC3 (explaining 15.6%
of the total variance)
Regarding specific misinformation concerning symptom
management and prevention, of the 1369 participants in Round
3, 301 (22%) participants agreed that hot temperatures kill the
virus, 295 (21.5%) participants agreed that UV rays kill the
virus, and 179 (13.1%) participants agreed that ibuprofen
exacerbates COVID-19 (see Table S2 in Multimedia Appendix
1). Greater support for symptom management and prevention
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misinformation (PC1) was significantly associated with younger
age and male gender, as well as with lower institutional trust
and greater rejection of official accounts (PC1) after controlling
for demographics (age, gender, education, and LOTE; see Table
5). For misinformation regarding causes and transmission, of
the 1369 participants, 167 (12.2%) participants agreed that the
virus causing COVID-19 was engineered and released from a
Chinese laboratory in Wuhan, 57 (4.2%) participants agreed
that parcels from China could spread the virus, and only 8
(0.6%) participants agreed that 5G networks are responsible for
the spread of the virus. Causes and transmission misinformation
(PC2) was significantly associated with less education and more
social disadvantage. Greater belief in these statements was also
associated with lower digital health literacy, reduced perceived
public threat, reduced institutional trust, and greater rejection
of official accounts after controlling for sociodemographic
variables (PC2; see Table 5). Regarding misinformation about
immunity and cure, of the 1369 participants in the sample, 62
(4.5%) participants agreed that vitamin C is an effective
treatment, 55 (4%) participants agreed that there is a cure or
vaccine for COVID-19, 32 (2.3%) participants agreed that
hydroxychloroquine is an effective treatment, and 15 (1.1%)
participants agreed that the flu shot provides immunity. Greater
support for immunity and cure misinformation (PC3) was
significantly associated with younger age. After controlling for
sociodemographic factors, lower digital health literacy, reduced
perceived public threat, reduced institutional trust, and greater
rejection of official accounts were associated with greater belief
in these statements (PC3; see Table 5).
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Table 5. Multivariable truncated linear regression of the misinformation beliefs in June (Round 3)a. Higher values of the outcome indicate greater
support for these beliefs. Data are presented as estimated marginal mean differences (95% confidence intervals) and P values.
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aSample for analysis (n=1366); occasional cases of missing data for explanatory variables were not imputed due to a small proportion of missingness
(3/1369, 0.2%).
bValues obtained in April (Round 1) and carried forward.
cMarginal mean differences are not reported for gender reported as “not specified” or “other” owing to small sample size but were included in the
regression model.
dCertificates I-IV are tertiary qualifications; see the Australian Qualifications Framework [25].
eMean of 8 items, range: 1-5.
fLikert scale, range: 1-10.
gMean of 4 items, range: 1-7.
hMean of 3 items, range: 1-7.
iMean of 4 items, range: 1-5.
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Our analysis showed lower institutional trust, lower digital
health literacy, and greater rejection of official accounts were
associated with a stronger agreement with COVID-19
misinformation beliefs. Misinformation was also more common
among participants who primarily spoke a LOTE at home, in
younger age groups, and in males. The most commonly held
misinformation beliefs were concerning symptom management
and prevention. We found small changes between April and
May in two of the misinformation items: an increase in
agreement with “COVID-19 is greatly exaggerated” and a
decrease in agreement with “herd immunity is beneficial for
COVID-19 but is covered up.” Despite these differences being
statistically significant, they likely have little to no practical
importance (ie, only a 0.08- and 0.12-unit change, respectively,
on a 7-point scale). Notably, the proportion of participants
agreeing with each item remained generally consistent over
time during and after lockdown restrictions.
The agreement rates of COVID-19 misinformation beliefs were
lower than those reported in other countries [26,27], but we
note that our study was not sampled to be representative of the
Australian population. An Australian poll conducted in May
2020 found relatively high support (12%-77%) for
misinformation beliefs relating to the creation, spread, and
prevention of the virus [28]. Interestingly, compared with the
results of this poll, we found a much lower prevalence of people
agreeing that 5G networks are spreading the virus. The poll
found demographic patterns similar to our findings, wherein
male and younger participants agreed with a range of COVID-19
misinformation beliefs more than other groups. Studies have
shown that in the United States and the United Kingdom,
younger people are more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs about
COVID-19 [29,30]. Moreover, other studies have found that
American men are more likely to agree with COVID-19
conspiracy theories than women [31].
The association between misinformation beliefs and lower
education, LOTE, younger age, and male gender point toward
important gaps in public health messaging to these specific
groups. Our recent study highlights similar disparities in
knowledge and behavior [17], as well as issues with the
complexity of government health information about COVID-19.
People with less education and LOTE had a poorer
understanding of COVID-19 symptoms and were less frequently
able to identify behaviors to prevent infection. Recently,
attention has been focused on the importance of reaching people
who do not speak English as their first language [32]. Our study
further highlights the need for health information to be written
to meet diverse health literacy requirements and targeted to
specific study groups. For instance, young people and
representatives of culturally and linguistically diverse groups
should be involved in the design of COVID-19 messages to
ensure appropriate tonality and delivery of the message. This
can be achieved by testing communications with these groups,
running consumer focus groups before releasing messages to
the public, and ensuring representation on public health
communication teams [33]. Ideally, a coproduction approach
should be used to ensure targeted community messages about
COVID-19 prevention are relevant and effective.
The provision of quality information online is unlikely to be a
sufficient strategy to counter the influence of misinformation
if digital health literacy is not accounted for. Messaging and
debunking must be delivered on multiple trusted channels [34],
consistent in content and style, and conveyed in local languages
to ensure engagement with all communities [35]. Emerging
evidence supports the idea that psychological
inoculation—pre-emptively exposing people to small doses of
misinformation techniques—can build resistance to false
information across cultures [36]. It will be important to invest
in programs teaching digital health literacy and healthy
skepticism of health news, including interventions nudging
people to consider the accuracy of COVID-19–related news
content before sharing it further [37]. Finally, partnerships
between public health authorities and trusted organizations to
deliver information and correct misinformation should be
utilized where possible [38]. Corrective messages are most
successful when they offer a coherent explanation for how and
why a belief based on misinformation is incorrect [39]. Research
shows that corrective information can counter misperceptions
and improve belief accuracy after an individual has been
exposed to misinformation [40].
Timely, accurate, and transparent messaging is vital to gaining
public trust in communication from authorities ahead of other,
less credible sources [41]. Although there now is intense global
interest aimed at limiting the spread of misinformation in the
first place [2,36,42], this will require “a sustained and
coordinated effort by independent fact-checkers, independent
news media, platform companies, and public authorities to help
the public understand and navigate the pandemic” [43].
Around the world and in Australia, antilockdown protests have
taken place in capital cities, with protesters voicing opposition
to vaccination, telecommunication towers, and COVID-19 hoax.
Researchers have recently investigated the degree to which
misinformation about COVID-19 is associated with people’s
willingness to adhere to public health recommendations and
government-enforced measures; they found that willingness
decreases significantly as the strength of misbeliefs increases
[44,45]; this also includes decreased intentions to avail a
COVID-19 vaccination [46]. In some cases, misinformation
has led to serious harm, such as the Iranian methanol poisoning
episode [47]. The spread of misinformation is an ongoing area
of concern as Australia and other countries worldwide continue
to live with the fluctuating realities of a global pandemic.
Correcting misinformation should be viewed as a vitally
important science and health policy activity [48]. Importantly,
the more extreme conspiracy beliefs were rare; for example,
fewer than 1% of the participants in our study sample endorsed
the 5G conspiracy. However, other beliefs were held by over
20% of the participants in certain demographics, indicating
widespread confusion or simply outdated information spread
among people, such as that regarding the use of ibuprofen.
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The study was large and diverse but not representative of the
national population. Given this, caution is needed in generalizing
from these prevalence findings. The sample was recruited via
an online panel and social media. The majority of participants
were well educated and a low proportion were from culturally
and linguistically diverse groups. Therefore, this sample may
not represent the demographics of all people concerned by
COVID-19 and vulnerable to misinformation, including older
adults. Participants recruited via Dynata were not included in
the follow-up (ie, Rounds 2 and 3) due to funding constraints.
Moreover, details of the specific social media platform(s) used
by the participants (eg, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook) were
not captured in our survey, but it is important to note that both
good- and poor-quality information may be obtained through
these channels. (Mis)information can come from various sources
such as family and friends, television, radio, print media, or
misinformed health care providers (including primary, allied,
alternative, and complementary health sectors). The use of social
media as a “top-3” information source was comparable across
education categories (ie, 45% for all 3 categories); however,
given the abovementioned limitation, it is unclear which
platform is being used by whom.
The longitudinal design of this study enabled us to evaluate
whether misinformation beliefs changed over the course of the
pandemic. By design, the survey items changed across time;
however, this prevented us from being able to determine
longitudinal changes in the PC derived at the baseline. Finally,
some of the misinformation items are likely contextual and
subjective (eg, “the government restrictions are stronger than
is needed”), which may have influenced the interpretation and
responses of some participants.
Incorrect information about COVID-19—whether labeled as
misinformation, myth, conspiracy theory, or rumor—circulates
every day, and our knowledge regarding the value of various
preventive interventions has progressed during the course of
the pandemic. While we acknowledge that some of the
misinformation items included in this survey were subject to
legitimate inquiry (eg, advice recommending against the use of
ibuprofen was issued by the World Health Organization early
in the pandemic but then retracted), they have since been
demonstrated to be scientifically incorrect, classified as
misinformation, and included on myth-busting lists of leading
public health institutions. The broader implication is that the
groups identified in this study are more likely to agree with
misinformation, including younger age, male, lower education,
lower health literacy, and LOTE, may not be receiving
up-to-date, evidence-based advice.
Conclusions
Misinformation can undermine public health efforts. The
findings of this survey-based study highlight important gaps in
communication effectiveness in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic. In efforts to prebunk and debunk misinformation,
public health authorities must urgently build new partnerships
with trusted, influential stakeholders and social media companies
to reach the groups identified in this study. Communicators
must pay close attention to ensuring that all communities can
access, understand, and act on reliable COVID-19 advice.
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